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1. Introduction 
Contests are a type of games in which players expend costly efforts (resources) in order 
to win prize(s). The effort expenditures by players determine their respective probabilities of 
winning a prize. The function that maps efforts into probabilities of winning is called a contest 
success function (CSF). One of the most frequently used CSFs in the contest literature is a lottery 
CSF of Tullock (1980); in which the probability of winning equals the ratio of a player’s effort to 
the sum of all players’ efforts.1 
In this paper we consider a Tullock-type contest in which players’ outcome-contingent 
payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. Under this structure 
we find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in this contest. We show 
that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also 
identify several contests in which multiple equilibria may arise under very general conditions. 
The existing literature documents that asymmetry in prize valuation (Nti, 1999), cost 
structure (Paul and Wilhite, 1990), and effectiveness in influencing the CSF (Gradstein, 1995) 
can result in asymmetric equilibrium. In this paper, however, we show that even under 
symmetric set up one may obtain asymmetric equilibria in Tullock-type contests. 
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) prove the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric 
equilibrium for a simple Tullock contest. Cornes and Hartley (2005) extend the analysis and 
argue that multiple equilibria may exist in contests with increasing returns CSFs. Yamazaki 
(2008) reaffirms this result for contests in which players are asymmetric in terms of value, 
effectiveness and budget constraints. In this paper we show that the uniqueness of equilibrium 
                                                 
1 Tullock’s lottery CSF is widely employed because a number of studies have provided axiomatic justification for it 
(Skaperdas 1996; Clark and Riis 1998). Also, Baye and Hoppe (2003) identified conditions under which a variety of 
rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games are equivalent to the Tullock contest. 
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crucially depends on the specification of the cost and spillover parameters in the payoff function. 
Under very general restrictions, even under a standard lottery CSF multiple equilibria may exist 
in symmetric Tullock contests. 
The finding that multiple equilibria may arise in simple Tullock-type contests is 
important for a number of reasons. First, in multi-stage or repeated games the existence of 
multiple non-payoff equivalent equilibria means that one can condition equilibrium selection in 
the subgame based on past behavior. This allows for a wide range of payoffs to be supported as 
subgame perfect equilibria. Second, in the presence of multiple equilibria, comparative statics 
have to be conditioned on a particular equilibrium since different equilibria may lead to different 
comparative statics results. Finally, the existence of multiple equilibria is important for designing 
both static and dynamic contests. A contest designer needs to account for the full profile of 
equilibria and corresponding comparative statics in order to achieve a given objective.  
 
2. Contest Model and Equilibria 
We consider a Tullock-type contest involving two risk-neutral players and two prizes. 
The players, denoted by 𝑖 and 𝑗, value the winning prize as 𝑊 > 0 and the losing prize as 𝐿 ∈ ℝ, 
with 𝑊 > 𝐿 . Players simultaneously expend efforts 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0  and 𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0 . The probability that 
player 𝑖 is the winner is decided by a lottery CSF: 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑥𝑖/(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)     if  𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 ≠ 0
1/2                     if  𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0
      (1) 
The outcome contingent payoff for player 𝑖 is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and 
the effort of the rival: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗            with probability          𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗              with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (2) 
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where 𝛼1, 𝛼2 are cost and 𝛽1, 𝛽2 are spillover parameters with restrictions 𝛼1 < 0 and 𝛼2 ≤ 0. 
Define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω), where Ω = {𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽1, 𝛽2} 
is a set of parameters. Under complete information the expected payoff for player 𝑖 is: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) =
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗) +
𝑥𝑗
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗)   (3) 
where (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) ≠ (0,0). For 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0, the expected payoff is 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) = (𝑊 + 𝐿)/2.  
By taking first order condition in (3), player 𝑖’s best response function (BRF) is  
𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹 = −𝑥𝑗 + √
{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}𝑥𝑗
2−{𝑊−𝐿}𝑥𝑗
𝛼1
      (4) 
if 𝑥𝑗 ≤ (𝑊 − 𝐿)/(−𝛼2 − 𝛽1 + 𝛽2) , and otherwise, 𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹 = 0 . And the corresponding unique 
symmetric equilibrium is:2  
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥 =
(𝑊−𝐿)
−(3𝛼1+𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
       (5) 
The slope of the BRF is derived as: 
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= −1 +
2{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}𝑥𝑗−{𝑊−𝐿}
2√𝛼1[{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}𝑥𝑗
2−{𝑊−𝐿}𝑥𝑗]
     (6) 
It is clear that the slope, as well as, the curvature of the BRF is different for different values of 
the cost and spillover parameters. The BRF is a parabola, and if the curvatures of the two BRFs 
are large enough, then the two parabolas may intersect in multiple points, generating multiple 
equilibria. Therefore, in addition to the symmetric equilibrium (5), the contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω) can 
generate two asymmetric equilibria (see Figures 1 and 2). The additional restriction (5𝛼1 −
𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0 guarantees a large enough curvature of the BRF to generate asymmetric 
equilibria {𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥; 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥} and {𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥; 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥}, where 
                                                 
2 This particular equilibrium is derived in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (forthcoming), who show that the needed 
restrictions for this equilibrium are: 𝛼1 < 0, 𝛼2 ≤ 0, 𝛽2 − 𝛼1 ≥ 0, and −(3𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0. They also 
show that when the BRF is positive, then the first order condition is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium. 
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𝑥 =
1
2
(𝑊−𝐿)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
[1 + √
(5𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
]     (7) 
𝑥 =
1
2
(𝑊−𝐿)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
[1 − √
(5𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
]     (8) 
By imposing further incentive compatibility restriction √
(5𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
≥
(4𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−2𝛽2)
(2𝛼1−𝛼2)−𝛽1
 we ensure that the players are willing to expend equilibria efforts, i.e., 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥, 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥)) ≥ 𝐿  and 𝐸(𝜋𝑗(𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥, 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥)) ≥ 𝐿 . These results are summarized in 
the following Proposition.3 
Proposition: In contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω), if −(3𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0 and 𝛽2 − 𝛼1 ≥ 0 then 
there exists a symmetric equilibrium defined by (5). Furthermore, if (5𝛼1 − 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) >
0  and √
(5𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
≥
(4𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−2𝛽2)
(2𝛼1−𝛼2)−𝛽1
 then in addition there exist two asymmetric 
equilibria defined by (7) and (8). 
 
3. Examples of Multiple Equilibria 
Next we consider several contests in which multiple equilibria may exist. In the ‘lazy 
winner’ contest of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (forthcoming) the winner faces lower marginal 
cost than the loser, i.e., Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 0,0})  with |𝛼1| < |𝛼2| . The payoff function for 
player 𝑖 is: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖          with probability          𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
𝛼2𝑥𝑖                 with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
   (9) 
                                                 
3 This type of equilibria is informally described by Schelling (1971) in the context of racial segregation. The 
proposition matches in flavour with Schelling’s conjecture on multiple equilibria (see Figure 19). Schelling shows 
that the symmetric equilibrium in his setting is a stable equilibrium, but the two asymmetric equilibria are unstable. 
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Under symmetric equilibrium, according to the proposition, both players expend equal efforts 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/(−3𝛼1 − 𝛼2). However, this contest can also generate multiple equilibria if the 
difference between the cost parameters is sufficiently high, i.e., 5𝛼1 > 𝛼2.
4 In Figure 1 we plot 
the BRFs for different values of marginal costs. When 𝛼1 = −0.25 and 𝛼2 = −1.75, the BRFs 
intersect three times, indicating one symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria. This result comes 
from the perceptive behavior of the players. One player gives more weight to the fact that the 
loser has a higher marginal cost and thus expends a low effort in equilibrium. On the other hand, 
the other player envisions a lower marginal cost of winning and expends a higher effort.  
Figure 1: BRFs and Equilibria in ‘Lazy Winner’ Contest (W = 1) 
 
Multiple equilibria can also arise in contests with spillovers (Chung, 1996; Chowdhury 
and Sheremeta, forthcoming). Consider, for example, a general ‘input spillover’ contest, where 
the effort expended by player 𝑗 partially benefits player 𝑖 and vice versa. Such a contest can be 
written as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, 𝛽1, 𝛽2}), where 𝛽1 ≥ 0 , 𝛽2 ≥ 0 , and 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 < 4 . The payoff 
function of ‘input spillover’ contest takes the form: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗         with probability  𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)        
 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗              with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
   (10) 
                                                 
4 The incentive compatibility restriction also holds. The two asymmetric equilibria, defined by the proposition, are 
given by {𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥; 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥} and {𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥; 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥}, where 𝑥 =
1
2
√𝛼1−𝛼2+√5𝛼1−𝛼2
√(𝛼1−𝛼2)
3
𝑊 and 𝑥 =
1
2
√𝛼1−𝛼2−√5𝛼1−𝛼2
√(𝛼1−𝛼2)
3
𝑊.  
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Under symmetric equilibrium, both players expend equal efforts 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/(4 − 𝛽1 + 𝛽2). 
Figure 2 displays the BRFs and the resulting equilibria for different values of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. When 
spillover gain of the loser is sufficiently higher than the spillover gain of the winner, we arrive at 
the case of multiple equilibria. In particular, any combination of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, such that 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 <
−4, will generate one symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria. In any asymmetric equilibrium, 
one player expends very high effort, increasing the chance of winning, while the other player 
expends very low effort, ensuring a significant spillover benefit from losing. This scenario 
resembles R&D contests in countries where property rights are not protected by the government 
and the spillover in case of losing is very high. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to free ride 
on the effort of the others. 
Figure 2: BRFs and Equilibria in ‘Input Spillover’ Contest (W = 1) 
 
One can apply our analysis to show that multiple equilibria can also arise in contests of 
Amegashie (1999), Glazer and Konrad (1999), and Matros and Armanios (2009). For example, 
Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {(1 − 𝑡)𝑊, 0, −(1 − 𝑡), −1,0,0}) in which the 
non-negative profit of a rent-seeker is taxed by a tax rate 𝑡 ∈ (0,1). It is easy to show that when 
the tax rate is excessively high (i.e., more than 80%) then, besides the symmetric equilibrium, 
multiple equilibria exist. In the endogenous prize value contest by Amegashie (1999), the 
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winner’s prize value is a linear function of own effort expended, i.e., Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −(1 −
𝑚), −1,0,0}) where 𝑚 ∈ (0,1) shows the impact of own effort on prize value. If this impact is 
high enough, then following the aforementioned logic this contest induces multiple equilibria. 
Finally, Matros and Armanios (2009) examine a contest where either the winner or the loser or 
both can be reimbursed. A two-payer version of the contest can be written as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, (𝛼 −
1), (𝛾 − 1), 0,0}) where 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) are the reimbursement parameters. Using our 
proposition, it is straightforward to show that when  5𝛼 − 4 > 𝛾  then, in addition to the 
symmetric equilibrium, two asymmetric equilibria exist.5 
There are other contest settings that can produce multiple equilibria. For example, Baye 
et al. (2005) use an all-pay auction to analyze several litigation systems in which the winner or 
the loser compensates a part of the rival’s legal expenditure. By modeling such litigation contests 
as Tullock-type contests, one can show that certain legal systems, such as the ‘Continental 
system of litigation,’ can produce multiple equilibria.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we construct a two-player Tullock contest under complete information and 
find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in this setting. We show that 
asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also 
identify several contests in which multiple equilibria may arise under very general conditions. 
The findings of this paper can be applied to areas of contest design, R&D spillovers, litigations 
and repeated games, where multiple equilibria may arise. One can also extend the analysis in the 
                                                 
5 Following the same procedure, one can derive multiple equilibria in Cohen and Sela (2005), where only the winner 
is reimbursed. This has been independently shown by Matros (2009).
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current study in terms of incomplete information, the number of players, risk aversion, and non-
linear CSFs. We leave these questions for future research. 
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